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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper asks if low political competition is associated with manipulation of public procurement pro-
cesses. Using unique Swedish municipal data from 2009 to 2015, it demonstrates that when one party 
dominates local politics, procurement quality decreases and corruption risks increase. Most striking is that 
the risk for getting only one bid on what is intended to be an open tender considerably increases with 
longstanding one-party-rule. Findings suggest that entrenched parties are able to exert favoritistic control 
over public procurement due to less well-functioning internal and external control mechanisms: bureau-
cratic human capital decreases, municipal audits are more prone to be controlled by the ruling majority, 
and politicians are less susceptible to media pressure. These results are particularly interesting from a 
comparative perspective since Sweden, being an old democracy with a meritocratic bureaucracy, low levels 
of corruption and clientelism is an unlikely case in which to find these tendencies.  
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Introduction 
The risk for power abuse is omnipresent, even in democracies.1 Constitutions, laws, and other regulations 
are written with the perspective in mind that while the ruling elite must have enough power to do good, 
they cannot be left unguarded. It is for example a common theme for the Federalist Papers; James Madi-
son (Hamilton, Madison and Jay [1788] 1961, 260) notes that: 
…power to advance the public happiness involves a discretion which may be misap-
plied and abused. They will see, therefore, that in all cases where power is to be con-
ferred, the point first to be decided is, whether such a power be necessary to the pub-
lic good; as the next will be, in case of an affirmative decision, to guard as effectually 
as possible against a perversion of the power to the public detriment.  
Motives for the ruling elite to exceed the powers given to them are diverse. While the most obvious risk is 
that they will take advantage of their position to enrich themselves and their clique at the expense of the 
public good (North et al 2009; Rothstein 2011), this is not the only motive. The nature of democratic 
politics is such that politicians tend to be biased toward delivering goods and services to their constituen-
cies. In young democracies with weak parties, distribution of public goods often takes the form of clien-
telism, but also in old democracies with stronger party-systems politicians sometimes use clientelistic link-
age strategies, or enter into pork-barrel politics (Berry and Fowler 2015; Kitschelt and Singer 2016; Stokes 
et al 2013). Moreover, even elected leaders with the public good in mind might be tempted to bend rules, 
for example in order to increase efficiency. Rules that are intended to safeguard against corruption risks, 
and other abuse of public power, often slows down decision making and might even lead to non-ideal 
outcomes.  
At least in democracies, these tendencies should diminish with increased elite competition over political 
power (Schumpeter 1947; for a related argument not only including democracies, see Acemoglu and Rob-
inson 2012). As a matter of fact, much of the political economy literature on rent seeking starts with the 
assumption that, although politicians are assumed to be selfish, political competition is the principal vehi-
cle which creates policies that benefit large parts of the electorate, rather than just the elite and their im-
mediate followers (Montinola and Jackman 2002; Gerring and Thacker 2004; Persson and Tabellini 2003; 
Rose-Ackerman 1978). 
                                                     
1 This paper is a part of the research project “Out of Control or over Controlled? Incentives, Audits and New Public Manage-
ment”, and we gratefully acknowledge financial support from Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (the Swedish Foundation for Humani-
ties and Social Sciences). In addition, the authors are also grateful for the Swedish Competition Authority (Konkurrensverket) 
and Visma Commerce AB for allowing the Swedish national public procurement database to be used for scientific research. 
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With these perspectives in mind, the public procurement process is an area where the political system is 
put to a critical test. Not only do public procurements involve huge sums of money today, amounting to 
15 percent of worldwide GDP (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 
2011, 39), but these are also critical situations when political elites interact with business elites, while hav-
ing the potential to use their positions to benefit their constituency, connected companies, or themselves. 
It is for example probable that a local firm should compete against outside companies in such cases. Even 
if the bid of an outside competitor is better, it would make perfect sense for both the local politician, and 
for their constituency, to accept some cost for favoring the local bidder, if that company contributes to 
the constituency in some other way, for example by offering local job opportunities. Moreover, politicians 
might be tempted to accept some kind of side payment for themselves, or their inner- or outer circle, in 
order to award a contract to a favored bidder, instead of the best bidder. Coviello and Gagliarducci (forth-
coming) indeed demonstrate that Italian local politics show clear signs of such behavior, like Klašnja 
(2016) finds evidence for it in Romania, and Fazekas (2015) in the UK. 
As these temptations are ubiquitous, most governance systems have devised legal and bureaucratic checks 
against them. In Europe, national and EU regulations of the common market aim to create a fair and 
open marketplace for government contracts. The EU Public Procurement Directives are devised to level 
the playing field for all bidders, connected or not, in the interest of the polity as a whole. The civil service 
and bureaucratic audit systems are supposed to secure compliance with rules of open and fair access to 
public resources. Where such systems work, public power is consequently not used to fulfill partisan, cli-
entelistic, or corrupt goals (Charron et al 2017).  
No system is bulletproof, however; in polities with long-term incumbents, the weight of the bureaucratic 
balance may erode. With low political competition, for example, loyalty between otherwise neutral and 
independent civil servants and representatives of the party in power may develop and pervert the system 
of control. Moreover, politicians can strengthen their positions when in power for a longer time, and build 
political-business networks that might in themselves generate pressure for collusion between politics and 
business. In line with resent research in this field (Coviello and Gagliarducci forthcoming; Klašnja 2016), 
this paper argues that low political competition creates “entrenched parties,” (Folke et al 2011, 578) able 
to control public procurement spending, and with the power to favor certain bidders, regardless of their 
formal merits.  
Therefore, this paper asks whether low political competition – in extreme cases, one-party-rule – makes it 
more likely for incumbents to manipulate public procurement processes – in other words, if low competi-
tiveness in the political arena within a polity decreases competitiveness when it comes to its dealings with 
the private sector. To this end, it also investigates the weakening of control mechanisms set up to stifle 
such tendencies. 
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This is particularly interesting in the light of the last years marketization reforms in the public sector, often 
seen as parts of the New Public Management (NPM) reform package (Hood 1991; Osborn and Gaebler 1992; 
Pollitt and Bouckaerd 2011). In Europe and the United States public procurement has increased rather 
dramatically, and while scholars have studied the effects of the creation of new markets for public goods, 
such as infrastructure, health care and public transportantion (Hood and Dixon 2015), the political con-
text is often not taken into account (O’Toole and Meier’s 2015). This paper suggests that without under-
standing how potentially efficiency enhancing reforms are affected by local political competition, the real 
effect of marketization might be misjudged.  
In order to answer this paper’s question, we turn to Swedish municipalities, arguably a least likely case of 
political manipulation of rules. We have a unique dataset at our disposal, including information about local 
political competition, public contracts and a large set of other relevant variables in all 290 Swedish munic-
ipalities between 2009 and 2015. We find that when one party dominates local politics, procurement pro-
cesses show increased corruption risks, while turnover has an immediately opposite effect. Most striking is 
that the risk of obtaining only one bid on what should be an open tender increases with one-party-rule, 
and that this result holds up also when we use other operationalizations of low political competition, in-
clude a wide set of controls, and employ a wide array of estimation techniques. The results suggest that 
entrenched parties are able to exert favoritistic control over public procurement due to a lower quality of 
the local bureaucracy, more partisan control over the local audit committee, and with politicians less ex-
posed to media pressure. The paper thus also contributes much-needed suggestions of the causal mecha-
nisms through which entrenched parties can disarm the democratic system’s control functions. 
The next section describes our theoretical expectations, more in detail. We then turn to a discussion about 
our research strategy, describing case selection and data in particular. After this discussion, we report the 
results from the empirical study, while the final section concludes.  
Why entrenched parties are more likely to decrease public procurement quality   
The rationale behind procurement from outside actors, instead of in-house production is a rather straight-
forward market mechanism. Generally speaking, the expectation is that competition for public contracts 
pressure prices downward, and quality upward (Christoffersen et al 2007; Donahue and Zeckhauser 2011). 
This expectation hinges, however, on the idea of open competition, but as OECD (2011, 147) notes, pub-
lic procurement is “…vulnerable to waste, fraud and corruption due to its complexity, the size of the fi-
nancial flows it generates and the close interaction between the public and the private sectors.” 
Given unavoidable moral hazard problems (Miller and Whitford 2016), there accordingly is a risk that 
politicians, bureaucrats, and contractors try to circumvent open competition and thereby put efficiency 
and quality enhancing mechanisms out of play (for the negative effects on economic growth of a system 
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connected firms, see Diwan et al 2016). Certainly, corrupt politicians and bureaucrats might be driven by 
personal monetary incentives (Fisman et al 2014), but as indicated already in the introduction, politicians 
might also have less selfish motives. They might favor, for example, a local company over an outside 
competitor because they consider local production to be better for their constituency (Coviello and 
Gagliarducci forthcoming; Klašnja 2016; Nyblade and Reed 2008). Moreover, there are also other, less 
strategic, motives for both politicians and bureaucrats, such as habit and loyalty, that both introduce bias 
against new contractors and for established ones. Finally, as public contracts are often large and not sel-
dom essential for the survival of firms, contractors are under such circumstances incentivized to use all 
available means to get the contracts, even if it includes shady or illegal activities (Amore-Bennedsen, 
2013).  
These hazards are well known by policy makers. Public procurement processes are therefore regulated in 
all OECD member states, as well as by the European Union (OECD 2011), in order to promote transpar-
ency in these processes. In Sweden, for example, no less than three laws regulate public procurement pro-
cesses: lagen om offentlig upphandling (2007:1091), lagen om upphandling inom områdena vatten, energi, transporter och 
posttjänster (2007:1092), and lagen om upphandling pa ̊ fo ̈rsvars- och säkerhetsområdet (2011:1029). 
The question under scrutiny here is whether low levels of political competition makes it more likely for 
incumbent rulers to manipulate public procurement processes, and thus override rules such as the set of 
laws just mentioned. Previous research on corruption makes us believe that could be the case. Starting 
from the idea that elite competition, and especially inter-party competition, drives up governance quality 
in democracies generally speaking (Schumpeter 1947), a large comparative literature studying the govern-
ance effects of electoral rules (Persson, Tabellini and Trabbi 2003), party systems (Tavits 2007), and de-
centralization (Gerring and Thacker 2004) has developed over recent decades. In very simplified terms, 
this line of research investigates, often by making broad cross-country comparisons, if there are negative 
correlations between institutions enhancing political competition and corruption (Chang and Golden 
20007; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Persson and Tabelini 1999).  
The corrective mechanism is thought to run from political competition, which in turn increases accounta-
bility, and thus ultimately relies on the assumption that voters punish corrupt incumbents. This assump-
tion is however only modestly supported by empirical studies. While it seems reasonably clear that voters 
to some extent cast their votes based on perceptions and experiences of corruption (Xezonakis et al 
2016), corrupt politicians are surprisingly often re-elected (Chang et al 2010). Recent papers have suggest-
ed that the relatively low electoral cost for corrupt politicians might be caused by hampering influences of 
ideology and absence of proximate parties (Charron and Bågenholm 2016), and that corruption voting 
crucially depends on its political salience (Ferraz and Finan 2008; Klašnja et al 2014). 
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Without meaningful political competition, the incumbent might, first, worry less about potential loss of 
votes, simply because the margin to the competitor is by definition larger, and, second, that the long ten-
ures often following from low political competition puts the incumbent in a position where they to some 
extent can control the salience of potential misconducts. In their recent paper, Coviello and Gagliarducci 
(forthcoming) demonstrate that politicians’ length of tenure in office indeed affects outcomes of public 
procurement processes in Italy. Their findings suggest that with longer time in office comes more risk of 
corruption, showing that increasing mayoral tenures lead to more local winners, more expensive contracts, 
and lower quality procurement processes in general. We would argue that this to some extent is an effect 
of long tenured incumbents’ ability to disarm internal, as well as external monitoring functions. If these 
functions worked as they should, they would, when they sounded the alarm, increase the salience of the 
issue and raise the electoral cost of such manipulations.  
Borrowing the terminology from congressional research, oversight is made up by some combination of 
“fire alarms” and “police patrols” (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 166). In our context, so-called fire 
alarms are introduced when processes are organized so that individuals or groups outside the colluding 
ring can follow a process and press the fire alarm if they see something suspicious. We can typically think 
about bureaucratic processes in this way. They introduce a relatively efficient way for politicians to handle 
information asymmetries (McCubbins, et al 1989), but can also be thought of as a way to introduce an 
embedded control mechanism on politicians (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017; Miller and Whitford 2016). 
Charron et al (2017) describe how procurement in Spanish municipalities are sometimes manipulated by 
politicians to extract rents, and how this hinges on politicians’ ability to control bureaucrats using their 
powers over appointments and salaries for example. Moreover, an interesting literature on the adoption of 
the merit system in US states describes how merit systems, and consequently less political control over the 
bureaucracy was accepted first after a political calculus of the incumbent (Ruhil and Camoes 2003). Simi-
larly, Ting et al (2012) show that incumbents would like to keep a patronage bureaucracy, as long as the 
incumbent expects to continuing winning its winning streak, while Folke et al (2011) show that political 
control over the bureaucracy can be transferred into vote gains. These studies are illustrations that politi-
cians appreciate the value of a direct control over the bureaucracy, and that they know how to transfer this 
control to some other currency, such as votes.  
We should however, also consider the possibility that the competing party, or parties, might be less likely 
to press the fire alarm when they are electorally weak. In his seminal book Party Government, E. E. 
Schattschneider (1942, 183) describes why partisanship is not by default an effective control of a powerful 
local party boss:  
Professional politicians as a class develop a remarkable solidarity when their privileges 
are attacked by the public. The bosses of the rival parties in the locality can often lend 
  8 
each other a helping hand. The tendency of the bosses to get together is enormously 
strengthened in regions where the disparity in the strength of parties is great. If one 
party is overwhelmingly strong and the other party is correspondingly weak, the temp-
tation of the stronger party to annex the weaker party is very great indeed. 
Moving on to the next type of oversight, we can think of local or national auditors as so-called police 
patrols. The metaphor is relevant because audits require a much more active role; auditors have to get an 
overview of the area, and then strike down on specific targets. The delegation literature seems to agree 
with McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) that fire alarms are generally more efficient than police patrols, as 
police patrols require more information and are more labor intensive. The scholarly corruption literature is 
also generally rather pessimistic about the effects of police patrol authorities such as audit- and anti-
corruption agencies, but using within country variation in Brazil, Melo et al (2009) show that political 
competition actually correlates with the effectiveness of audit institutions, that is, more effective police 
patrol agencies. Moreover, they demonstrate the importance of the institutional setting—a less volatile 
party system and more programmatic linkage strategies make the audit institutions more effective too. In 
conclusion, while audits and other similar functions are not expected to exert a strong curb on corruption 
in public procurement in general, still in highly institutionalized parts of the world, such as Sweden, they 
may turn out to be effective controls. 
Another external control system, often viewed as an efficient tool for combating corruption, is the media 
(Treisman 2007). Media coverage of corruption increases salience and can therefore affect the level of 
corruption voting (Ferraz and Finan 2008; Klašnja et al 2014). Investigative journalism might very well 
expose shady procurement deals and large media coverage guarantees that voters will be informed of po-
tential political misbehavior (Svaleryd and Vlachos 2009). Gordon (2011) documents how vendors in 
districts crucial for electoral success for the Republican party, first got unusually large contracts, and then, 
after the Washington Post had described this as a manipulation effort, how this effect disappeared. This 
check nevertheless hinges on politicians being susceptible to media critique, which is not given in a con-
text of low political competition (Besley and Prat 2006). For example, with a larger margin to the runner-
up the incumbent is probably less worried.  
If bureaucrats are to use the more efficient fire alarm mechanism, they both need to be outside the collud-
ing group, and to have incentives to sound the alarm. Police patrols mechanisms, both internal (audits) 
and external (media), could also be linked to political competition and tenure length, as they too can be 
manipulated and/or ignored. In situations with low political competition, neither of these prerequisites are 
necessarily fulfilled. We use the terminology from Folke et al (2011) and refer to parties able to influence 
the monitoring mechanisms through their dominance as entrenched parties. Low political competition cre-
ates situations where the same parties are in office over long periods of time. During such time periods, 
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several control functions could be put out of play. We see at least four ways entrenched parties can take 
advantage of their positions, and one reason for why they might be pressured to do so by local networks: 
First, elected politicians are hierarchically superior to the most highly ranked bureaucrats even in civil 
service systems. This will under all circumstances put a stress on the neutrality of bureaucrats, but where 
careers of politicians and bureaucrats are separated, bureaucrats are likely to be able to handle and resist 
potential pressure to bend rules (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017; Miller and Whitford 2016). Bureaucrats 
also have the advantage of being inside the system for the long-run. However, with low political competi-
tion, the longevity advantage disappears and bureaucrats become more dependent on politicians of a par-
ticular party. It is not unlikely that more partisan loyalty follows, as entrenched parties could also bias 
applicant selection so that mostly those who sympathize with the party in power get appointed (for a clas-
sic, and partly similar way of reasoning about salary levels in the bureaucracy and corruption, see Becker 
and Stigler 1974). Under normal circumstances the bureaucrat is also the expert while the politician – 
using Weber’s ([1921] 1978, 991) famous words – is the “dilettante” facing him or her. But with long ten-
ures, incumbent politicians and parties are likely to become experts as well. They develop their own 
knowledge, which makes them less dependent on bureaucrats, or they create an organization with the 
technical expertise within the party, again making them independent from bureaucratic expertise. The 
power balance thus shifts to the benefit of politicians. Moreover, the competence of bureaucrats could 
also have an indirect effect. In a study of bureaucratic turnover in India, Iyer and Mani (2012) describe 
how politicians can use frequent reassignments to control bureaucrats even in civil service systems that 
should insulate bureaucrats from political pressure. Highly competent bureaucrats are however less sus-
ceptible to such pressures, which indicates that with competence comes the ability to resist pressure from 
entrenched parties. For, as noted by Schattschneider (1942, 176), “the boss lives by bad administration.” 
Second, politicians can always use their appointment power and appoint loyalists (Lewis 2008). This is also 
done in low-patronage countries, such as the UK (Boyne et al 2010) and Sweden (Dahlström and 
Holmgren 2017). Entrenched parties are nevertheless incentivized to use this power more aggressively, 
because with turnover comes the risk of the other party doing the same thing the next turn, while with 
low political competition this cost diminishes (Grzymała-Busse 2007).   
Third, as already briefly mentioned, with a larger vining margin, or outstanding political craft and experi-
ence—the very definition of low political competition—comes the opportunity to from time to time han-
dle critique from outside actors, such as the media, and thus accept some electoral cost. Entrenched par-
ties are therefore likely often in a position where they can ignore the risk of being scrutinized by media.   
Forth, and finally, entrenchment also implies stronger networks with the outside community, including 
tighter bonds with contractors (Coviello and Gagliarducci forthcoming). This will probably increase pres-
sure on politicians to circumvent open competition, as well as their ability to do so. In such cases, well-
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connected contractors likely find themselves in positions to call in favors from time to time. And at the 
same time, politicians that were happy with what these contractors have delivered before are probably 
tempted to overlook some irregularities in order to give the contract to someone they know and trust. 
Taken together, we expect a negative correlation between political competition and the quality of public 
procurement processes. We also expect the quality of the bureaucracy to be lower, a tighter political con-
trol over audits, politicians to be less susceptible to media critique and, finally, tighter networks between 
politics and business, with more local winners. 
Empirical strategy 
In the remainder of the paper, we will statistically estimate the relationship between political entrenchment 
and public procurement quality in Swedish municipalities. Such an empirical strategy of studying local-
level politics within a single polity is methodologically beneficial for at least two reasons: First, restricting 
the scope to a single country drastically diminishes the risk of omitted variable bias (Alt and Lassen 2003); 
since Sweden is a country of moderate size, and a unitary state, this risk is likely to decrease even further. 
Second, the sub-national level of analysis is also an effective antidote to ecological fallacies, derived from 
what Snyder (2001) refers to as “whole nation bias,” wherein considerable sub-national variation is made 
invisible on behalf of national-level averages.  
The case of Sweden  
Sweden is a medium-sized (ten million inhabitants) state in northern Europe. Despite its unitary structure, 
Swedish 290 municipalities are unusually autonomous and legally independent entities, in charge of most 
public services – such as education, child-, social- and elderly care, resulting in a majority of the country’s 
public servants being employed in the municipal sector (Statistics Sweden 2014). Like on the national 
level, its proportional electoral system means that local politics tend to involve a relatively large number of 
parties represented, usually the seven or eight that are represented in the national parliament, with an in-
creasing but still limited presence of local parties. Despite a long-standing dominance of the Social Demo-
cratic party on the national level (although they were in the opposition during most of the period under 
study herein), local politics have traditionally contained much more ideological variation, with a consider-
able share of municipalities ruled by centre-right or rainbow coalitions (Erlingsson and Wänström 2015).  
As mentioned above, studying political and institutional malpractice and dysfunctionality in a Swedish 
local context is particularly illuminating, considering the country’s noted relative absence of corruption, 
clientelism and institutional failure. Despite a recent growing trend of political appointees, the nature of 
Swedish public administration is still decidedly Weberian and meritocratic, also at the local level (Dahl-
ström, et al 2014; Garsten, et al 2015). Each municipality has its own audit committee, responsible for 
overseeing operational effectiveness of municipal operations (Swedish Association of Local Authorities 
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and Regions [SALAR] 2014). In contrast to the body of public servants, these committees are politically 
appointed, but usually the chair is a representative of the opposition, and the actual audit reports are al-
most aways written by outside experts.  
Furthermore, going local is likely the most appropriate level for investigation for our purpose, since pork-
barrel politics has been found to have a local flavor in many democracies. In the US, for example, partisan 
control over federal expenditures systematically affects what districts receive funds (Berry and Fowler 
2015; Berry et al 2010; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Kriner and Reeves 2015; Levitt and Snyder 1995). 
Even in Sweden, there are indications of common recourses sometimes being funneled locally for partisan 
purposes (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002; Johansson 2003). Other studies have shown that the length of 
tenure in office for mayors in Italy is associated with adverse procurement outcomes (Coviello and 
Gagliarducci forthcoming), that family ties to local politicians in Denmark—another low-corruption coun-
try—increase firm profitability—especially in industries relying on public demand (Amore-Bennedsen, 
2013), and that low political competition is associated with higher legal political rents among local gov-
ernments even in Sweden (Svaleryd and Vlachos 2009). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that biased 
spending will be traceable foremost on the local level.  
Sweden and its municipalities is also an ideal setting in which to study public procurement processes: 
First, according to the Swedish Competition Authority (SCA), public works, goods and services of about 
625 billion Swedish kronor ($71 billion) were bought by public entities such as municipalities, agencies, 
publicly owned companies in 2012. This adds up to nearly a fifth of total Swedish GDP in the same year 
(SCA 2015, 14), and puts Sweden in the upper quartile in comparison with other OECD countries, where 
the Netherlands is in the very top, and the average is about 13 percent (OECD 2011, 149). Public pro-
curement is thus a large and important part of public spending in Sweden, as in the rest of the OECD. 
Furthermore, reflecting its importance as the principal public service provider in the country, 70 percent 
of all procurements are made by municipalities and their companies (SCA 2015, 29). 
Finally, the object of analysis considered herein is not only politically and administratively relevant, but 
also decidedly local in nature. Even the lowest official EU classification of sub-national units (NUTS3) 
contains an average of 14 Swedish municipalities, and, although the thirteen largest municipalities have a 
population exceeding 100,000, the median size is a modest 15,235 inhabitants. 
Although the strategy of stydying within-country variation in Sweden clearly stops short of generating 
universally applicable results across all institutional, political, and cultural contexts, the underlying expecta-
tion is that any positive results indicating problems with institutional quality here would likely be more 
limited than in contexts where politicians are generally freer to engage in illicit, clientelistic, or corrupt 
activities.  
  12 
Swedish public procurement data  
In Sweden, the only publicly available source of public procurement data is the EU-wide Tenders Elec-
tronic Daily,2 which only reports large-value contracts regulated by the EU’s Public Procurement Direc-
tives. Given the paper’s main interest in municipal public procurement, we also collected data on smaller 
contracts whose values fall below the EU reporting thresholds, but are above the national thresholds.3 As 
there is no public database of these smaller contracts, we obtained the data directly from a private data 
provider (Visma Opic),4 which in effect implements the relevant transparency provisions of the Swedish 
Public Procurement Act. According to law, tenders below the EU threshold are either published by Visma 
Opic directly or another local tendering portal from which Visma Opic collects the information, and en-
ters it into a consolidated database. As there is no publication requirement for direct awards below the 
national threshold, the database only contains such low value tenders if they were voluntarily published. 
Due to the fragmented and unregulated public procurement publication process, data formats and con-
tents are very diverse and consolidation into a unique database is problematic; hence, Visma Opic manual-
ly collects and enters data where necessary and also searches for missing information where possible. 
Nevertheless, data quality is an issue forcing our analysis, leading us to only use those variables that are 
reliable enough (Fazekas and Tóth 2016). In total, there are 135,007 unique tenders in the database be-
tween 2009 and 2015, roughly 70 percent belonging to the national regime, and 30 percent to the EU 
regime. 
In addition, in order to increase the precission in our measures, we restrict the sample in two other ways. 
First, we only use contracts awarded by local bodies, that is municipalities and municipal enterprises, 
which shrinks the sample to 89,951 unique tenders. Second, we remove non-competitive markets defined 
in line with prior research (Charron et al 2017), that is, all those markets which have less than five unique 
bidders in the whole 2009-2015 period. This equals 521 tenders, or 0.58 percent of the sample, leading to 
a final tender count of 89,430. 
Single bidding ratio as an indicator of public procurement quality 
Our measure of public procurement quality aims to directly measure a deliberate restriction of open com-
petition for government contracts in order to benefit a certain company. We operationalize our dependent 
variable as only one bid being submitted in a tender on an otherwise competitive market. Specifically, we 
employ a simple measure of the extent to which procurement tenders receive a single bid in a municipali-
ty: single bidding ratio. If a municipality, during a given year, has had multiple bidders for all of its tenders, it 
                                                     
2 http://ted.europa.eu/ 
3 This contract value range for example in 2015 was approximately between 54,000 and 134,000 EUR. 
4 The authors would like to express their gratitude to Visma Opic for releasing the data for scientific research. 
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will score a 0. If no tenders received more than one bid, it will receive a score of 100. Hence, the measure 
we use in the municipality database is the percentage of single-bidder contracts awarded of all the awarded 
contracts by a municipality in a given year.5 
Altough single bidding on competitive markets may result from a range of non-corrupt situations, such as 
incompetence or capacity constraints in the industry, a wide ranging evidence points at its validity as a 
corruption risk indicator (Charron et al 2017). In the Swedish context, we show that non-Swedish firms 
winning public procurement contracts are close to ten percentage points more likely to be single bidders if 
they are registered in a tax haven such as Panama than registered in non-tax haven countries such as Ger-
many (figure 1). This suggests that proceeds of corruption that may have been earned through single bid-
ding contracts are then often channeled through secrecy jurisdictions, in order to hide money flows 
(Shaxson and Christensen 2013). Similar to findings in other countries (Fazekas and Kocsis 2017), single 
bidding is associated with more expensive contracts when compared to initial cost estimates produced by 
independent experts (12.1 percent single bidding in contracts below initial estimates, that is discounted 
final contract value, as contrasted with 14.3 percent single bidding in contacts with on or above initial 
estimates, that is no or negative discount).  
FIGURE 1, COMPARING THE INCIDENCE OF SINGLE BIDDING (%) AMONG FOREIGN SUPPLIERS AC-
CORDING TO THE COUNTRY OF INCORPORATION, SWEDEN, 2009-2015 
 
Note. Differences are significant at the 6% level, significance levels obtained using monte carlo random permutation simulations in stata 
14.0, N=501 
                                                     
5 Cancelled and incomplete tenders are excluded. 
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Public bodies that have corrupt or illicit intent can avoid detection in two ways: First, they may conceal 
their contracts altogether by splitting them up into smaller contracts, each falling under the national re-
porting threshold (e.g. about 500 000 SEK for services); second, they may omit important bits of infor-
mation from the public notices, without which detecting wrongdoing is nearly impossible (e.g. name of 
the winner and contract value). Both of these strategies pose specific risks to our estimations, hence we 
also test whether they are correlated with our dependent. We measure contract concealment by calculating 
the proportion of advertised public procurement contract value in our database to total municipal spend-
ing on public procurement from local budget statistics.6 We measure omitted information by counting the 
number of data points missing from the following seven mandatory items: buyer address, buyer post code, 
buyer settlement, contract value, supplier name, number of bids received, and contract award date. Quite 
reassuringly, on the level of municipalities, neither of these indicators is significantly correlated with single 
bidding ratio, our main dependent variable (linear correlation coefficients are -0.072 and -0.022 respective-
ly).  
Independent variables  
Our primary measure of political entrenchment is one-party rule, a dummy variable indicating whether the 
same party has held the highest political post (in Swedish, “kommunstyrelsens ordförande,” the chair of 
the executive board; henceforth “mayor”) during the entire era of modern Swedish municipalities, which 
began with a massive wave of mergers in the early 1970s.7 Although most municipalities have experienced 
at least one turnover in power, as late as in 2015, over one-fifth of Swedish municipalities still had not. It 
should be noted that, due to Sweden’s proportional electoral system, staying in power for an extended 
period of time requires a large measure of political skill, both relating toward the electorate and other par-
ties in the municipality. For example, if voters of a ruling party to the right, such as Moderaterna, are not 
satisfied with the party’s rule or policies, there are three ideologically close alternatives representing a simi-
lar ideology (Centerpartiet, Folkpartiet, or Kristdemokraterna). Although coalition rule is a very common occur-
rence, and Swedish mayors are indirectly elected by the local assembly, Karlson and Gilljam (2016, 704) 
note that the mayor is the “undisputed leader of a Swedish municipality,” and local politicians consider 
this post to hold as much power as the municipal executive board (analogous to its government) at large 
(Erlingsson and Öhrvall 2017). Although Sweden is perhaps not usually associated with the type of au-
thoritarian “strongman rule” commonplace in many developing countries, the term is frequently used 
                                                     
6
 Local budget data obtained from Statistics Sweden, see: 
http://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__OE__OE0107__OE0107A/VerksKostn/?rxid=cf1795c9-c357-4f58-
bacc-7b9c37110dba. 
Budget items considered to be indicative of total public procurement spending are total material costs and total cost of services 
purchased, including purchase of operations (this methodology is in line with the OECD-Eurostat methodology for measuring 
public procurement spending from budget statistics [Audet 2002]). 
7 See table A1 in the online appendix for a full list of Swedish municipalities and their respective one party rule-status. 
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about Swedish mayors (to the extent that one of the country’s public service channels in 2010 aired a 
comedy series about a small-town mayor entitled Starke man, i.e., “strongman.” 
Secondly, we also employ an alternative operationalization of political entrenchment through the variable 
new ruling party, indicating whether the incumbent party is new for a given term.8 Although one-party rule 
is likely the best representation of an entrenched political landscape, this additional measure provides a 
contrasting perspective of mayoral parties’ entrenchment. Even if strongly incentivized to embark on such 
a process, new ruling parties are unlikely to achieve this in the short run, as their permeation of the politi-
cal and administrative structure, for example by strategical staffing, is bound to take time, especially in the 
Swedish context where meritocratic recruitment largely outshadows any type of spoils system (Dahlström 
et al 2014).  
Control variables 
In addition to political entrenchment, the estimations below will also include the size of population, and 
(land) area of each municipality. More populous municipalities will likely have more competitive markets, 
and thus prone to receive a higher number of procurement offers, while larger municipalities involve larg-
er transaction costs that may dissuade companies from placing an offer. Furthermore, we include median 
income, as wealthier municipalities reasonably will tend to attract more companies. Finally, we include the 
identity of the ruling party, in part due to the fact that the type of political leadership is likely to capture a 
number of otherwise immeasurable socioeconomic factors – as an example, one will find stark differences 
between municipalities that only have been ruled by the main party on the political left, Socialdemokraterna, 
which tend to be industrial small towns, and the largest conservative party, Moderaterna, which are generally 
wealthy metropolitan suburbs. Furthermore, although we have no prior expectations regarding the matter, 
one cannot exclude the possibility that different parties operate in different ways regarding the political 
establishment’s views and approaches to public procurement. 
Estimation strategy 
To predict single bidding, we employ a panel regression framework, with errors clustered at the municipal 
level. As the within-municipality variation in one-party rule is too small for any meaningful interpretations 
from fixed effects (FEs) estimations,9 its relationship to single bidding is estimated using random effects 
(RE)-estimation, while the models using New ruling party, which contains ample within-municipality varia-
tion,10 use municipal FEs. As single bidding is only weakly autocorrelated,11 we will mainly rely on static 
                                                     
8 This is captured on a term-period basis, except when ruling party changes ex-elections.  
9 Only 17 of Sweden’s 290 municipalities (5.9%) lost their one-party rule-status during the 2009-15 period. 
10 169 municipalities (58%) had a new party taking over during the 2009-15 period. 
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estimations, complemented by AR1 and lagged dependent variable (LDV) approaches.12 Table 1 below 
displays the summary statistics of the main variables. 
TABLE 1, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES USED IN MAIN ESTIMATIONS 
 
n mean sd min max 
            
Single bidding ratio 1,901 12.5 14.9 0 100 
One-party rule 1,901 0.24 
   
New ruling party  1,901 0.29 
   
Population (log) 1,901 9.89 0.95 7.79 13.7 
Area (log) 1,901 6.49 1.26 2.16 9.87 
Median income 1,901 238,585 25,033 185,383 350,934 
Ruling party (% of cases) 
   
Socialdemokraterna 1,901 48.1 
   
Moderaterna 1,901 31.2 
   
Centerpartiet 1,901 15.3 
   
Kristdemokraterna 1,901 1.58 
   
Folkpartiet 1,901 2.00 
   
Vänsterpartiet 1,901 0.79 
   Other party 1,901 1.05 
   
            
 
Results  
To recapitulate, our overarching hypothesis is that one-party rule municipalities will have less well-
functioning public procurement processes, operationalized through the variable single bidding ratio, while 
municipalities with a new ruling party will have more well-functuning public procurement processes, and 
thus display lower single bidding ratios. Below, we first present the results of the main tests of this link, 
followed by a series of robustness tests. Finally, the closing part of the section investigates the proposed 
mechanisms through which any such relationship is likely to flow. 
Main results 
First, a simple bivariate look offers initial support for both hypotheses. As evident from figure 2, one-
party-rule-municipalities are indeed associated with a higher propensity for single bidding. Compared to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
11 The correlation coefficient between single bidding and its one-year lag is weakly positive (r=0.13); a Wooldrige (2002, see 
also Drukker 2003) test of serial correlation demonstrates that the hypothesis of serial correlation fails the 95% level of signifi-
cance (p=0.09). 
12 The fact that the LDV approach excludes 14% of the cases (i.e. all observations for 2009), and in the fixed effects estima-
tions likely introduces Nickel bias, should be noted. 
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their equivalents that have experienced turnover, it is associated with three points higher single bidding, an 
increase of roughly one third (or a fifth of a standard deviation). Contrastingly, new-ruling-party-
municipalities score two points lower in single bidding than municipalities with returning incumbent par-
ties. 
FIGURE 2, POLITICAL ENTRENCHMENT AND SINGLE BIDDING RATIO. 
 
Note. n=1,901. Full results for One-party rule in column 1, table 2; full results for New ruling party in column 1, table 3. 
Capped lines display 95% confidence intervals using standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Estimations using New ruling 
party includes municipality-fixed effects.  
For one-party rule, this relationship is only marginally weakened when introducing the battery of control 
variables, which work in the expected direction (sparsely populated, poor, and geographically large munic-
ipalities significantly predict higher single bidding). Column 6 in table 2, which, along with year fixed ef-
fects, displays the fully controlled static estimation, shows that one-party rule is associated with a 2.6 
(p<0.05) increase in single bidding, once all of these factors are accounted for. To account for the – albeit 
modest (see note 10) – serial correlation, columns 7 (bivariate) and 8 (fully controlled) display the results 
from AR1 estimations, while columns 9 and 10 include a lag of single bidding ratio. The first set of esti-
mations are essentially identical to the static iterations, while the LDV approach diminishes the coefficient 
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for one-party rule to about 80 percent of its original size, which is nevertheless still significant at the 95 
percent level.13  
TABLE 2, SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND ONE-PARTY RULE. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
                                                Static        AR1          LDV 
                      
One-party rule 2.99*** 2.85*** 3.10*** 2.90*** 2.52** 2.60** 3.09*** 2.66** 2.48** 2.06** 
 
(1.04) (1.01) (1.03) (1.00) (1.11) (1.04) (1.07) (1.08) (1.03) (1.02) 
Population (log) 
 
-1.96*** 
   
-1.43*** 
 
-1.44*** 
 
-1.35*** 
  
(0.52) 
   
(0.48) 
 
(0.53) 
 
(0.52) 
Area (log) 
  
1.36*** 
  
0.87** 
 
0.91** 
 
0.82* 
   
(0.36) 
  
(0.43) 
 
(0.41) 
 
(0.46) 
Median income 
   
-0.00*** 
 
-0.00** 
 
-0.00* 
 
-0.00** 
    
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Single bidding ratiot-1 
        
-0.01 -0.03 
         
(0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 11.77*** 28.47*** 0.28 28.19*** 9.60*** 27.20*** 11.73*** 33.16*** 12.61*** 31.68*** 
 
(0.52) (5.70) (2.52) (4.70) (1.33) (8.55) (0.53) (7.54) (0.68) (8.89) 
           
Observations 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,576 1,576 
Municipalities 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 284 284 
Municipal FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Party FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Shifting focus to our second operationalization of political entrenchment, new ruling party, the results are 
in line with the bivariate findings above, as we observe an equally consistent negative, albeit both smaller 
and weaker, relationship with single bidding ratio. Across the estimations, its coefficient varies little de-
pending on the choice of specification, negative to the magnitude of 1.90 to 2.21 points, and significant at 
the 95 percent level in the static estimations (columns 1-5), and the 90 percent level or better in the esti-
mations accounting for autocorrelation (columns 6-9).  
                                                     
13 It should be noted that in supplementary estimations, not displayed here but available by request from the authors, reveal 
that this decrease is driven by the loss of observations caused by the inclusion of the LDV, rather than the accounting of the 
autocorrelation in itself. 
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TABLE 3, SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND NEW RULING PARTY. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
                                                Static       AR1         LDV 
                    
New ruling party -2.03** -1.90** -2.00** -2.21** -2.11** -2.00* -2.03* -2.19** -2.08* 
 
(0.84) (0.87) (0.86) (0.92) (0.93) (1.16) (1.22) (1.03) (1.13) 
Population (log) 
 
24.99 
  
24.67 
 
-4.52 
 
29.94 
  
(21.29) 
  
(21.40) 
 
(5.84) 
 
(29.74) 
Median income   0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Single bidding ratiot-1        -0.16*** -0.17*** 
        (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 13.09*** -236.2 2.04 11.62*** -225.0 13.64*** 72.38** 15.68*** -271.3 
 
(0.24) (210.0) (32.38) (1.64) (207.2) (0.44) (35.83) (0.57) (286.9) 
          
Observations 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,613 1,613 1,576 1,576 
R-squared 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  
0.03 0.06 
Municipalities 288 288 288 288 288 287 287 284 284 
Municipal FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Party FE NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Robustness 
Although the main analyses already contain several specifications testing the relationship between political 
entrenchment and single bidding, a number of alterations to the original estimation strategy were made to 
ascertain the robustness of our findings.  
First, we employ panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995, 2009), which results in negligible 
changes to the main results (see table A2 and A3 in the online appendix for full results).  
Second, we estimate the effect of one-party rule and new ruling party on single bidding ratio on the con-
tract level, which allows for controlling for contract characteristics which are likely to influence bidder 
numbers (tables A4 and A5). To this end, we conduct propensity score matching of contracts using the 
following covariates (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009): Contract value, product group (2 digit CPV codes), 
whether the contract is below or above EU reporting thresholds, the number of contracts awarded per 
year, and type of municipal buyer (municipal administration or municipal company). These variables are 
expected to control for major confounding factors which would otherwise bias our effect estimates. Using 
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a fundamentally different analytical method and a different level of observations delivers strikingly similar 
effect size estimates of 1.9 to 3.8 points for one-party rule compared to the above municipality-level time 
series models (significant at all usual confidence levels). 
Third, we use an alternate indicator of political entrenchment, ruling party vote share, under the assumption 
that, similar to incumbents who have monopolized power for an extended period of time, electorally larg-
er incumbent parties will have more leeway in shaping both policy and administrative structure of a polity. 
As this variable contains meaningful within-municipality variation, tables A6 and A7 display the same 
estimations with and without municipality-fixed effects. The results are consistently positive with the ex-
ception of the uncontrolled FE estimation using AR1 errors (but significantly positive once controls are 
included), and, notably, significant at the 90 percent level or better in the bivariate RE-estimation (column 
1) as well as all specifications employing the full battery of control variables both using RE and FE. 
Fourth, we exclude municipal-years with fewer than three tenders from the main estimations (tables A8 
and A9). This approach renders results in the same direction as in table 2 and 3, with one-party rule signif-
icantly positive at the 95 percent level in all estimations except the fully controlled AR1 model (p=.107), 
while new ruling party remains consistently negative yet shy of significance.  
Fifth, we exclude the northern region of Sweden (SE3, using the NUTS nomenclature), where most small 
and isolated municipalities are found, in order to check whether our findings are driven by the differences 
between the sparsely populated north with less developed supplier markets and more entrenched parties 
and the densely populated south with more developed procurement markets and more competitive local 
politics (see figure A1). While still substantively reflecting the main results, both the coefficient for one-
party rule (table A10) and new ruling party (table A11) weakens, losing significance in the presence of 
certain controls (p=.108 for one-party rule with only party FEs; p=.104 for new ruling party with only 
population), and the dynamic estimations (for one-party rule, only the LDV estimations, which, again, 
suffer from lost observations; for new ruling party, both AR1 and LDV estimations).  
Sixth, we also repeat the contract-level analysis by excluding the northern region of Sweden (SE3) (table 
A12 and A13). Again, our estimates are close to the above main regression results with effect size estimat-
ed to be 0.5  to 3.1 percent (with only the matched difference statistically significant). 
Seventh, since the three latter alterations, which to a varying degree suppress the focal results compared to 
the original estimations, also strongly relate to the population size of municipalities,14 there is reason to 
believe that simply including this factor as a control – as we did in the original estimations – does not 
sufficiently account for its influence, particularly in the FE models used for new ruling party, which by 
                                                     
14 Mean population size for SE3- versuts SE 1 or SE2-municipalities = 21,054/39,757. Mean population size for municipality-
years with below- versus above three tenders = 9,474/37,682.  
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design only manages to control for within-municipality variation in population. Indeed, as Rose-Ackerman 
(1999, 101) notes, corrupt networks are likely to be more easily maintained in smaller settings, where there 
tends to be a more limited number of actors involved in such activity. In line with this, and regardless of 
whether the goal is corruption or simply pragmatism, smaller municipalities may also be conducive for a 
higher degree of informalism inherent to the political-bureacuratic-business axis, in turn leading to politi-
cal entrenchment having a comparatively larger effect over things like public procurement quality. There-
fore, we rerun the original estimations with the sample split down the median in terms of population size 
(15,235) (table A14 and A15). Indeed, the results strongly indicate that political entrenchment is more 
pernicious in smaller municipalities, especially when it comes to the short-term process of instating a new 
ruling party, whose negative coefficient in this setting dramatically increases to more than double its origi-
nal size, while it is rendered insignificantly positive in large municipalities. The same trend is, to a lesser 
degree, observable for one-party rule, which compared to the original estimations displays larger coeffi-
cients in small municipalities and smaller in large ones. 
Finally, we consider the possibility of an asymmetric dimension to the possibilities of manipulating pro-
curement processes. Specifically, even if the sheer proportion of single bidding tenders is small, the most 
convincing way of ascertaining that competition is not compromised is when every single tender is com-
petitive. To this end, we predict the likelihood of all tenders having more than one bid, contingent on 
one-party rule (table A16) and new ruling party (table A17). Once population size15 is taken into account, 
one-party rule is associated with a 58 percent higher probability of having at least one single bidding ten-
der, compared to experience with turnover (pr = 0.25 versus 0.16; difference: p<0.01; see figure A2 for 
predicted probabilities). The corresponding difference between municipal-years with new ruling parties 
and returning incumbents is also in the expected direction, but left just shy of significance (pr = 0.22 ver-
sus 0.27; difference: p=.13), once the standard battery of controls is included (although, when using con-
ditional fixed effects, the association is significant at the 90 percent level). 
Mechanisms 
We now turn to the specific mechanisms accounting for why and how political entrenchment may de-
crease competition in public procurement. In the theoretical discussion, we identified three potential 
mechanisms through which this relationship could operate. First, political entrenchment may suppress 
external “police patrol” functions within a polity. Second, entrenched politicians may also silence the “fire 
alarm” by ensuring that their own competency is not rivaled by local bureaucrats. Third, networks be-
tween politicians and local business may have had longer time to develop when one party has been in rule 
for an extended period of time.  
                                                     
15 This factor is bound to mechanically increase the risk of at least one instance of single bidding, due to the simple fact that 
larger municipalities tend to issue a greater number of tenders and contracts. 
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Using cross-sectional averages for 2011-2014 – the one full term period with data available for single bid-
ding16 – we first analyze the respective associations between one-party rule and new ruling party and, in 
turn, the “police patrol” mechanisms of audit control – operationalized as whether the chair in the munic-
ipal audit comes from the ruling majority (data from Statistics Sweden 2017a), as well as media accounta-
bility – using a survey question for politicians in the ruling majority of the extent to which election prom-
ises come to fruition through local media pressure (data from a 2012-13 survey of local politicians, Gilljam 
and Karlsson 2013). Second, for the fire alarm mechanism, we estimate human capital in bureaucracy – 
measured as the share of municipal employees with post-secondary education (data from Kolada, n.d.). 
Finally, we estimate local networks as the share of local winners in municipal public procurement (using 
our own data, provided by Visma Opic). We then estimate the association between these mediating varia-
bles and single bidding ratio. Each relationship is tested bivariately and with the full set of control varia-
bles (i.e. population, area, median income, and ruling party ID). For human capital in bureaucracy, the 
human capital of the local population at large (operationalized as share inhabitants with high education 
with data from Statistics Sweden 2017b) has been included as a further check that it is not the general 
level of education in the population that drives both political entrenchment and human capital in the bu-
reaucracy. Similarly, the media accountability model includes a measure of newspaper coverage, estimated 
as the ratio of local newspaper subscriptions to number of households, to ensure that this does not drive 
both entrenchment and politicians’ sensitivity to journalists (data from TI Mediestatistik n.d.).17 
The results, displayed in figure 3 below, tell a mixed but largely predictable story. Although almost all of 
the relationships are in the expected direction, not all are significant in both steps. Although one-party rule 
and new ruling party strongly predict majority-chaired audits, positively in the first case and negatively in 
the second, this is in turn only insignificantly related to more single bidding (panel A). On the other hand, 
both media influence (panel B) and bureaucratic human capital (panel C) are significantly lower in one-
party rule municipalities (at the 90 percent level for human capital with all controls included), insignificant-
ly higher (except for the bivariate estimation for human capital) in municipalities with a new ruling party, 
and predict lower levels of single bidding themselves. The most glaring absence of a meaningful relation-
ship, between new ruling party and human capital, is not surprising, considering how the Weberian char-
acter of the Swedish system of public administration, as opposed to a spoils-system, likely prevents an 
incoming incumbent from quickly reshuffling the bureaucracy to match their preferences. Finally, local 
                                                     
16 In cases of intra-term-period changes in ruling party, only the years for which the party that ruled during 2012 – the year for 
which the Gilljam and Karlsson’s (2013) survey applies – are taken into account. 
17 As the cross-sectional estimations are comparatively sensitive to outliers, which in turn are driven by a low number of tenders 
during the term period for certain municipalities, only municipalities with more than 2 tenders with information on single bidding 
recorded during the term period are included. While this strategy manages to exclude most extreme cases, the municipality of 
Dals-Ed (seven tenders during the term period) remains an outlier and is dropped. Descriptive statistics for available in table 
A18 in the online appendix. 
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winner ratio (panel D) is significantly related neither to one-party rule, new ruling party, nor (once control 
variables are included) single bidding. 
FIGURE 3, MECHANISMS.  
 
 
Note. Capped lines display 95% confidence intervals using robust standard errors. Estimates based on regressions of which the full results 
are available in tables A19-A22 in the online appendix. 
The fact that essentially all relationships go in the expected direction, but display varying strength individ-
ually, points to a multicausal story at play, where certain plot points are more convincing than others. 
While it seems like the internal police patrol function is indeed weaker in one-party municipalities and 
stronger where power has just shifted, its potency for ascertaining competitive procurement is itself only 
marginal, the media appears to be an important external check. Similarly, high skilled bureaucrats appear 
to be able to use their “alarm” function to a higher degree in turnover municipalities, with better pro-
curement as a result. Finally, we find only very weak evidence of local networks disproportionally influ-
encing the procurement process.  
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Conclusions  
This paper suggests that tendencies to manipulate public procurement processes so that they serve the 
interest of the party, constituency, group, or individual politicians instead of the general public is stronger 
when political competition is low (Fazekas 2015; Svaleryd and Vlachos 2009). Employing a unique dataset, 
including information about local political competition, going back decades in time, public contracts and a 
large set of other relevant variables in Swedish municipalities between 2009 and 2015, our results demon-
strate that when political competition is low, and especially when one party dominates for a long time, 
public procurement processes show signs of manipulation. Although marginally weaker, we also observe 
that when a new ruling party comes to power, procurement processes are more well-functuning. These 
relationships are compounded in smaller municipalities, where these problems are already more severe, 
and are roubust to a large number of alterations to the original estimation strategy.  
Moreover, we propose that when one party dominates the political scene, the control mechanisms within 
the political system—internal as well as external—will tend to erode: The entrenched party prefers bad 
administration, disarms the audit function, and can afford to neglect media scrutiny. In line with this ar-
gument, we show that political entrenchment is empirically associated with a less educated bureaucracy, 
thus potentially more easily manipulated, a municipal audit system dominated by the ruling majority, and 
rulers being less prone to be influenced by media pressure. 
Considering its strong history of programmatic parties and low levels of corruption and clientelism, Swe-
den is a particularly suitable case for the purposes of this study, in all likelihood very close to a least-likely 
case. Thus, our case selection makes our study stand in sharp contrast to recent papers, which have tended 
to focus on young democracies and/or institutionally weak settings (Coviello and Gagliarducci forthcom-
ing; Klašnja 2016). 
The results corroborate a fundamental expectation in the political economy literature, when it shows how 
low political competition goes together with bad government (Gerring and Thacker 2004; Montinola and 
Jackman 2002; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Rose-Ackerman 1978). This is an important contribution in 
itself, as such an association has previously mostly been studied on the aggregate level, and compared 
between countries. The paper also advances the knowledge when it shows how entrenched parties can 
take advantage of the bureaucratic apparatus (Folke et al 2011; Ruhil and Camoes 2003). The latter finding 
could shed new light over why corrupt politicians are surprisingly often re-elected (Chang et al 2010), 
because if the salience of corruption is critical for corruption voting, as recently suggested (Ferraz and 
Finan 2008; Klašnja et al 2014), then disarming mechanisms that could otherwise draw voters’ attention to 
the issue gives the entrenched party a huge advantage. 
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The paper, furthermore, contributes to an ongoing discussion about Swedish politics and institutions, 
where scholars today disagree whether low political competition and entrenched parties really increase 
risks for rent seeking. Although they discuss distinct types of rents, Bergh et al (2013) finds no, or very 
weak, association between corruption and low political competition, while Svaleryd and Vlachos (2009) 
conclude that legal rent seeking is more common in municipalities with a dominant party or party group, 
and Hyytinen et al (2008) suggest that the political leaning of the local administration influences whether 
local firms are favored or not. With the new data presented and analysed in this study, there are, at least 
when it comes to public procurement, indeed reasons for concern.   
Finally, our results are also interesting for policy makers and scholars in public administration. This study 
implies that advocates for marketization in the public sector, and students thereof, should pay close atten-
tion not only to the administrative, but also to the party poltical context in which such New Public Manage-
ment (NPM) reforms are implemented (Hood 1991; Osborn and Gaebler 1992; Pollitt and Bouckaerd 
2011). To some extent, it therefore answers to O’Toole and Meier’s (2015) call for a more general theory 
of public management that also takes the political context into account. The last decades have seen a dra-
matic increase in public procurement and other NPM-related reforms (Hood and Dixon 2015), and while 
creating a market for example for infrastructure, or elederly care might hold a potential for increased 
productivity in theory, such reforms might instead be turned into partisian assets in the hands of local 
party bosses.  
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A1. SWEDISH MUNICIPALITIES AND ONE-PARTY RULE 
Municipality 
 
Municipality 
 
Municipality 
 Ale Turnover Essunga Shift 2011 Hylte Turnover 
Alingsås Turnover Fagersta Turnover Järfälla Turnover 
Älmhult Turnover Falkenberg Turnover Jokkmokk Turnover 
Älvdalen Turnover Falköping Turnover Jönköping Turnover 
Alvesta Turnover Falun Turnover Kalix Turnover 
Älvkarleby One-party rule Färgelanda Turnover Kalmar Turnover 
Älvsbyn One-party rule Filipstad One-party rule Karlsborg Turnover 
Åmål Turnover Finspång Turnover Karlshamn One-party rule 
Aneby Turnover Flen Turnover Karlskoga One-party rule 
Ånge One-party rule Forshaga Turnover Karlskrona Turnover 
Ängelholm Turnover Gagnef Turnover Karlstad Turnover 
Arboga One-party rule Gällivare Shift 2015 Katrineholm One-party rule 
Åre Turnover Gävle One-party rule Kävlinge Turnover 
Årjäng Shift 2014 Gislaved Turnover Kil Turnover 
Arjeplog Turnover Gnesta Turnover Kinda Turnover 
Arvidsjaur One-party rule Gnosjö Turnover Kiruna Turnover 
Arvika Turnover Göteborg Turnover Klippan Turnover 
Åsele Turnover Götene Turnover Knivsta Turnover 
Askersund Turnover Gotland Turnover Köping One-party rule 
Åstorp Turnover Grästorp Turnover Kramfors One-party rule 
Åtvidaberg Turnover Grums One-party rule Kristianstad Turnover 
Avesta Turnover Gullspång Turnover Kristinehamn Turnover 
Båstad Turnover Habo Turnover Krokom Turnover 
Bengtsfors Turnover Håbo Turnover Kumla One-party rule 
Berg Turnover Hagfors One-party rule Kungalv Turnover 
Bjurholm Turnover Hällefors One-party rule Kungsbacka Turnover 
Bjuv Turnover Hallsberg One-party rule Kungsör Turnover 
Boden Turnover Hallstahammar One-party rule Laholm Turnover 
Bollebygd Turnover Halmstad Turnover Landskrona Turnover 
Bollnäs Turnover Hammarö Shift 2011 Laxå Shift 2015 
Borås Turnover Haninge Turnover Lekeberg Turnover 
Borgholm Turnover Haparanda One-party rule Leksand One-party rule 
Borlänge One-party rule Härjedalen One-party rule Lerum Turnover 
Botkyrka Turnover Härnösand Turnover Lessebo One-party rule 
Boxholm One-party rule Härryda Turnover Lidingö One-party rule 
Bräcke One-party rule Hässleholm Turnover Lidköping Turnover 
Bromölla One-party rule Heby Turnover Lilla Edet Turnover 
Burlöv One-party rule Hedemora Turnover Lindesberg Turnover 
Dals-Ed One-party rule Helsingborg Turnover Linköping Turnover 
Danderyd One-party rule Herrljunga Shift 2014 Ljungby Turnover 
Degerfors Turnover Hjo Turnover Ljusdal Turnover 
Dorotea Turnover Hofors One-party rule Ljusnarsberg One-party rule 
Eda Turnover Höganäs Turnover Lomma Turnover 
Ekerö Turnover Högsby Turnover Ludvika One-party rule 
Eksjö Turnover Höör Turnover Luleå One-party rule 
Emmaboda Turnover Hörby Turnover Lund Turnover 
Enköping Turnover Huddinge Turnover Lycksele One-party rule 
Eskilstuna One-party rule Hudiksvall Turnover Lysekil Turnover 
Eslöv Turnover Hultsfred Turnover Malå Turnover 
(continued on next page) 
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(TABLE A1, CONTINUED) 
Municipality 
 
Municipality 
 
Municipality 
 Malmö Turnover Partille Turnover Tibro Shift 2015 
Malung-Sälen Turnover Perstorp Turnover Tidaholm Turnover 
Mariestad Turnover Piteå One-party rule Tierp One-party rule 
Mark Turnover Ragunda One-party rule Timrå Turnover 
Markaryd Turnover Rättvik Turnover Tingsryd Turnover 
Mellerud Shift 2015 Robertsfors Turnover Tjörn Turnover 
Mjölby Turnover Ronneby Shift 2011 Tomelilla Turnover 
Mölndal Turnover Säffle One-party rule Töreboda Turnover 
Mönsterås Turnover Sala Turnover Torsås Turnover 
Mora Turnover Salem One-party rule Torsby Turnover 
Mörbylånga Turnover Sandviken One-party rule Tranås Turnover 
Motala Turnover Säter Turnover Tranemo One-party rule 
Mullsjö Turnover Sävsjö Turnover Trelleborg Turnover 
Munkedal Turnover Sigtuna Turnover Trollhättan One-party rule 
Munkfors One-party rule Simrishamn Turnover Trosa Turnover 
Nacka One-party rule Sjöbo Turnover Tyresö Turnover 
Nässjö Turnover Skara Turnover Uddevalla Turnover 
Nora Turnover Skellefteå One-party rule Ulricehamn Turnover 
Norberg Turnover Skinnskatteberg Turnover Umeå Turnover 
Nordanstig Turnover Skövde Turnover Upplands Väsby Turnover 
Nordmaling Turnover Skurup Turnover Upplands-Bro Turnover 
Norrköping Turnover Smedjebacken One-party rule Uppsala Turnover 
Norrtälje Turnover Söderhamn One-party rule Uppvidinge Turnover 
Norsjö Turnover Söderköping Turnover Vadstena Turnover 
Nybro Turnover Södertälje Turnover Vaggeryd Turnover 
Nyköping Turnover Sollefteå One-party rule Valdemarsvik Turnover 
Nykvarn Turnover Sollentuna Turnover Vallentuna Turnover 
Nynäshamn One-party rule Solna Turnover Vänersborg Turnover 
Ockelbo One-party rule Sölvesborg Turnover Vännäs Turnover 
Öckerö Turnover Sorsele Turnover Vansbro Turnover 
Ödeshög Turnover Sotenäs Turnover Vara Turnover 
Olofström One-party rule Staffanstorp Turnover Varberg Turnover 
Örebro Turnover Stenungsund Turnover Vårgårda Shift 2011 
Örkelljunga Turnover Stockholm Turnover Värmdö Turnover 
Örnsköldsvik One-party rule Storfors One-party rule Värnamo One-party rule 
Orsa Turnover Storuman Turnover Västerås Turnover 
Orust Turnover Strängnäs Turnover Västervik Turnover 
Osby Turnover Strömstad Turnover Vaxholm Turnover 
Oskarshamn One-party rule Strömsund Turnover Växjö Turnover 
Österåker Turnover Sundbyberg Turnover Vellinge Turnover 
Östersund Turnover Sundsvall Shift 2011 Vetlanda Shift 2011 
Östhammar Turnover Sunne Shift 2015 Vilhelmina Turnover 
Östra Göinge Shift 2011 Surahammar One-party rule Vimmerby Shift 2011 
Ovanåker Turnover Svalöv Turnover Vindeln Turnover 
Överkalix Shift 2015 Svedala Turnover Vingåker Turnover 
Övertorneå Turnover Svenljunga Shift 2015 Ydre One-party rule 
Oxelösund One-party rule Täby Turnover Ystad Turnover 
Pajala Turnover Tanum Turnover 
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TABLE A2. SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND ONE-PARTY RULE,   
PANEL CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
                                               Static            AR1         LDV 
                      
One-party rule 3.20*** 2.85*** 3.10*** 2.88*** 2.64*** 2.84*** 3.11*** 2.82*** 2.02*** 1.59** 
 
(0.50) (0.54) (0.48) (0.49) (0.40) (0.47) (0.62) (0.58) (0.68) (0.73) 
Population (log) 
 
-2.05*** 
   
-1.55*** 
 
-1.53** 
 
-1.12 
  
(0.41) 
   
(0.54) 
 
(0.63) 
 
(0.69) 
Area (log) 
  
1.42*** 
  
1.04*** 
 
1.03*** 
 
1.08*** 
   
(0.18) 
  
(0.17) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.28) 
Median income 
   
-0.00*** 
 
-0.00*** 
 
-0.00*** 
 
-0.00** 
    
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Single bidding ratiot-1 
        
0.10 0.07 
         
(0.21) (0.22) 
Constant 11.75*** 29.17*** -0.35 28.30*** 9.23*** 26.90*** 11.74*** 26.69*** 11.19*** 22.19*** 
 
(0.12) (4.10) (1.24) (1.45) (0.16) (5.01) (0.12) (5.25) (2.46) (6.51) 
           
Observations 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,544 1,544 
R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.06 
Municipalities 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 270 270 
Municipal FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Party FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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TABLE A3. SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND NEW RULING PARTY,  
PANEL CORRECTED STANDARD ERRORS. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
                                                  Static           AR1        LDV 
                    
New ruling party -2.20* -2.08* -2.16* -2.25* -2.19* -2.10* -2.03* -2.18** -1.99** 
 
(1.25) (1.25) (1.23) (1.16) (1.19) (1.18) (1.17) (0.93) (0.86) 
Population (log) 
 
15.82 
  
20.49 
 
22.74** 
 
33.50*** 
  
(13.06) 
  
(13.17) 
 
(11.10) 
 
(6.11) 
Median income 
  
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
   
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Single bidding ratiot-1 
       
-0.16 -0.16 
        
(0.21) (0.21) 
Constant 8.89*** -161.9 15.05 7.54*** -186.2 8.89*** -215.0* 11.03*** -330.8*** 
 
(1.26) (138.3) (18.09) (2.18) (139.0) (1.21) (120.2) (1.56) (65.29) 
          
Observations 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,870 1,544 1,544 
R-squared 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.28 0.30 
Municipalities 278 278 278 278 278 278 278 270 270 
Municipal FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Party FE NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
TABLE A4. SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND ONE-PARTY RULE, CONTRACT-LEVEL. 
 
Raw comparison Propensity score matching 
Turnover 11.493 9.518 
One-party rule 13.362 13.353 
Difference 1.868*** 3.835*** 
95% confidence interval: lower 
bound 1.140 1.830 
95% confidence interval: upper 
bound 2.597 5.840 
N 56,303 56,301 
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TABLE A5. SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND NEW RULING PARTY, CONTRACT-LEVEL. 
 
Raw comparison Propensity score matching 
Returning ruling party 
11.773 12.364 
New ruling party 
11.631 11.631 
difference 
-0.142 -0.733* 
95% confidence interval: lower bound 
-0.768 -1.495 
95% confidence interval: upper bound 
0.483 0.029 
N 
27,846 27,846 
Note: * significant at 6% level 
 
 
TABLE A6. SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND RULING PARTY VOTE SHARE, FE ESTIMATION. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
                                               Static          AR1        LDV 
                    
Ruling party vote share 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.14* 0.15* -0.01 0.20* 0.00 0.21** 
 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Population (log) 
 
29.80 
  
29.14 
 
-3.87 
 
32.87 
  
(20.92) 
  
(21.13) 
 
(6.39) 
 
(29.59) 
Median income 
  
0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
   
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Single bidding ratiot-1 
       
-0.16*** -0.16*** 
        
(0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 9.67*** -287.7 -5.31 4.53 -279.2 13.57*** 56.33 14.88*** -314.2 
 
(2.27) (206.4) (33.18) (3.48) (203.9) (2.44) (35.75) (3.71) (284.4) 
          Observations 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,610 1,610 1,574 1,574 
R-squared 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
  
0.03 0.06 
Municipalities 288 288 288 288 288 287 287 284 284 
Municipal FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Party FE NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A7. SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND RULING PARTY VOTE SHARE, RE ESTIMATION. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
                                              Static            AR1         LDV 
                    
Ruling party vote 
share 0.07* 0.05 0.07** 0.10** 0.10** 0.06 0.10* 0.05 0.16*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) 
Population (log) 
 
-2.04*** 
  
-1.21** 
 
-1.22** 
 
-1.00* 
  
(0.51) 
  
(0.49) 
 
(0.55) 
 
(0.53) 
Median income 
  
-0.00*** 
 
-0.00*** 
 
-0.00*** 
 
-0.00*** 
   
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Single bidding ratiot-1 
       
-0.00 -0.03 
        
(0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 10.11*** 28.11*** 27.83*** 6.16** 33.02*** 10.26*** 40.02*** 11.22*** 33.50*** 
 
(1.41) (5.85) (4.72) (2.59) (7.40) (1.48) (6.63) (1.76) (7.54) 
          Observations 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,574 1,574 
Municipalities 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 284 284 
Municipal FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Party FE NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A8. SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND ONE-PARTY RULE,  
MUNICIPAL-YEARS WITH LESS THAN THREE TENDERS EXCLUDED. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
                                                       Static       AR1          LDV 
                      
One-party rule 2.19*** 2.15*** 2.15*** 2.10*** 1.81** 1.90** 2.29*** 1.88** 2.26*** 1.96** 
 
(0.80) (0.80) (0.77) (0.78) (0.88) (0.80) (0.87) (0.85) (0.84) (0.82) 
Population (log) 
 
-1.52*** 
   
-1.18*** 
 
-1.25*** 
 
-1.11*** 
  
(0.41) 
   
(0.40) 
 
(0.41) 
 
(0.38) 
Area (log) 
  
1.62*** 
  
1.36*** 
 
1.39*** 
 
1.12*** 
   
(0.31) 
  
(0.35) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.36) 
Median income 
   
-0.00*** 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00* 
    
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Single bidding ratiot-1 
        
0.05 0.02 
         
(0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 11.68*** 23.02*** -2.64 24.06*** 8.57*** 16.88*** 11.67*** 24.26*** 11.74*** 23.07*** 
 
(0.42) (4.43) (1.96) (3.64) (0.99) (5.68) (0.42) (5.82) (0.51) (5.89) 
           
Observations 1,697 1,697 1,697 1,697 1,697 1,697 1,697 1,697 1,460 1,460 
Municipalities 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 
Municipal FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Party FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A9. SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND NEW RULING PARTY,  
MUNICIPAL-YEARS WITH LESS THAN THREE TENDERS EXCLUDED. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
                                            Static           AR1          LDV 
                    
New ruling party -0.96 -0.68 -0.72 -0.97 -0.96 -0.47 -0.71 -1.04 -1.22 
 
(0.75) (0.77) (0.76) (0.84) (0.84) (0.98) (1.05) (0.92) (1.05) 
Population (log) 
 
5.36 
  
12.99 
 
-1.79 
 
21.66 
  
(22.56) 
  
(23.77) 
 
(23.85) 
 
(30.56) 
Median income 
  
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
   
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Single bidding ratiot-1 
       
-0.11** -0.11** 
        
(0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 12.53*** -44.74 25.48 9.29*** -97.77 13.20*** -45.32 14.51*** -193.2 
 
(0.21) (224.9) (23.62) (1.18) (228.8) (0.36) (28.41) (0.60) (299.0) 
          
Observations 1,697 1,697 1,697 1,697 1,697 1,421 1,421 1,460 1,460 
R-squared 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
  
0.02 0.04 
Municipalities 276 276 276 276 276 269 269 276 276 
Municipal FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Party FE NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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FIGURE A1. MAP OF SWEDISH MUNICIPALITIES, BY NUTS3-REGION.  
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TABLE A10. SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND ONE-PARTY RULE,  
SE3-MUNICIPALITIES EXCLUDED. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
                                                            Static                AR1              LDV 
                      
One-party rule 2.62* 2.69* 3.35** 2.94** 2.46 2.60* 2.95** 2.77** 0.88 0.71 
 
(1.50) (1.42) (1.46) (1.38) (1.53) (1.47) (1.36) (1.41) (1.32) (1.39) 
Population (log) 
 
-1.38** 
   
-0.85 
 
-0.84 
 
-0.81 
  
(0.59) 
   
(0.55) 
 
(0.64) 
 
(0.70) 
Area (log) 
  
0.86** 
  
0.17 
 
0.16 
 
-0.09 
   
(0.41) 
  
(0.45) 
 
(0.63) 
 
(0.44) 
Median income 
   
-0.00*** 
 
-0.00*** 
 
-0.00** 
 
-0.00*** 
    
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Single bidding ratiot-1 
        
0.01 -0.01 
         
(0.05) (0.05) 
Constant 11.20*** 22.64*** 3.60 25.12*** 9.39*** 31.37*** 11.10*** 37.49*** 11.84*** 36.23*** 
 
(0.55) (6.57) (2.88) (4.58) (1.65) (9.03) (0.59) (9.30) (0.77) (10.03) 
           
Observations 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,123 1,123 
Municipalities 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 204 202 202 
Municipal FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Party FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A11. SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND NEW RULING PARTY,  
SE3-MUNICIPALITIES EXCLUDED. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
                                                  Static        AR1        LDV 
                    
New ruling party -1.87** -1.60 -1.72* -2.57** -2.33** -1.39 -1.98 -1.33 -1.79 
 
(0.92) (0.98) (0.95) (1.17) (1.16) (1.19) (1.29) (1.05) (1.30) 
Population (log) 
 
42.55 
  
40.14 
 
64.25* 
 
26.54 
  
(31.00) 
  
(29.67) 
 
(35.79) 
 
(34.77) 
Median income 
  
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
   
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Single bidding ratiot-1 
       
-0.10* -0.11** 
        
(0.05) (0.05) 
Constant 12.17*** -416.8 -41.09 11.98*** -422.0 12.53*** -4.75 13.59*** -294.8 
 
(0.28) (310.4) (40.68) (2.23) (300.7) (0.45) (37.29) (0.70) (343.8) 
          
Observations 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,146 1,146 1,123 1,123 
R-squared 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
  
0.01 0.04 
Municipalities 204 204 204 204 204 203 203 202 202 
Municipal FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Party FE NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Standard errors, clustered at the municipal level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
TABLE A12. SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND ONE-PARTY RULE,  
SE3-MUNICIPALITIES EXCLUDED, CONTRACT LEVEL. 
 
Raw comparison Propensity score matching 
Turnover 11.113 8.482 
One-party rule 11.621 11.621 
Difference 0.507 3.138*** 
95% Confidence interval: lower 
bound -0.508 0.610 
95% Confidence interval: upper 
bound 1.523 5.667 
N 44,014 44,014 
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TABLE A13. SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND NEW RULING PARTY,  
SE3-MUNICIPALITIES EXCLUDED, CONTRACT LEVEL 
 
Raw comparison Propensity score matching 
Returning ruling party 10.893 11.692 
New ruling party 11.372 11.372 
Difference 0.480 -0.320 
95% Confidence interval: lower 
bound -0.193 -1.136 
95% Confidence interval: upper 
bound 1.152 0.496 
N 23,480 23,480 
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TABLE A14. SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND ONE-PARTY RULE IN SMALL AND LARGE MUNICIPALITIES. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 
                                                        Small municipalities                                                                           Large municipalities 
 
                                       Static AR1 LDV                                        Static          AR1         LDV 
                                          
One-party rule 3.54** 3.67** 3.84** 3.19** 3.15* 3.08* 3.79** 3.26* 2.91* 2.68 1.90* 1.92* 1.80* 2.11** 1.42 1.35 1.86** 0.64 1.08 0.34 
 
(1.68) (1.63) (1.69) (1.62) (1.77) (1.62) (1.89) (1.91) (1.68) (1.75) (1.05) (1.02) (0.99) (1.05) (1.15) (1.03) (0.87) (0.84) (0.91) (0.91) 
Population (log) 
 
-7.27*** 
   
-6.04*** 
 
-5.96*** 
 
-6.40** 
 
-1.32*** 
   
-1.30*** 
 
-1.38*** 
 
-1.27*** 
  
(2.15) 
   
(2.20) 
 
(2.12) 
 
(2.74) 
 
(0.43) 
   
(0.44) 
 
(0.46) 
 
(0.38) 
Area (log) 
  
1.46** 
  
0.02 
 
0.08 
 
-0.22 
  
1.21*** 
  
1.17*** 
 
1.31*** 
 
1.03*** 
   
(0.70) 
  
(0.84) 
 
(0.80) 
 
(0.92) 
  
(0.29) 
  
(0.32) 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.28) 
Median income 
   
-0.00*** 
 
-0.00** 
 
-0.00** 
 
-0.00** 
   
-0.00** 
 
-0.00 
 
0.00* 
 
-0.00 
    
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
   
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Single bidding ratiot-1 
        
-0.02 -0.06 
        
0.19*** 0.14*** 
         
(0.04) (0.04) 
        
(0.05) (0.04) 
Constant 12.69*** 77.35*** 1.58 42.60*** 11.26*** 87.58*** 12.63*** 92.23*** 13.96*** 97.03*** 10.96*** 21.14*** -0.55 16.79*** 8.21*** 14.80** 10.96*** 11.63* 9.64*** 17.79*** 
 
(1.03) (20.05) (5.09) (9.52) (2.55) (26.20) (1.02) (22.92) (1.22) (31.37) (0.34) (4.75) (1.96) (3.98) (0.81) (6.52) (0.40) (6.33) (0.55) (5.80) 
                     
Observations 903 903 903 903 903 903 903 903 724 724 998 998 998 998 998 998 998 998 852 852 
Municipalities 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 140 140 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 
Municipal FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Party FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES NO NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Small municipalities = below median minimum population (15,532) during the sample period (2009-15); large municipalities = above median. Standard errors, clustered at the 
municipal level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A15. SINGLE BIDDING RATIO AND NEW RULING PARTY IN SMALL AND LARGE MUNICIPALITIES. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 
                                                       Small municipalities                                                                    Large municipalities 
 
                                       Static        AR1        LDV                                            Static            AR1             LDV 
                                      
New ruling party -4.58*** -4.73*** -4.66*** -5.06*** -4.99*** -5.13** -4.87** -5.66*** -5.39** 0.12 0.80 0.84 0.89 0.93 0.61 0.81 0.56 0.99 
 
(1.51) (1.53) (1.53) (1.65) (1.66) (2.26) (2.39) (1.94) (2.14) (0.79) (0.80) (0.78) (0.84) (0.83) (0.97) (1.02) (0.90) (1.04) 
Population (log) 
 
14.74 
  
14.08 
 
-9.40 
 
28.18 
 
-4.65 
  
7.04 
 
10.69 
 
11.43 
  
(40.04) 
  
(41.21) 
 
(10.16) 
 
(51.96) 
 
(20.65) 
  
(21.48) 
 
(23.35) 
 
(29.84) 
Median income 
  
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
  
-0.00** 
 
-0.00** 
 
-0.00* 
 
-0.00** 
   
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Single bidding ratiot-1 
       
-0.17*** -0.17*** 
       
-0.11** -0.14*** 
        
(0.04) (0.04) 
       
(0.05) (0.04) 
Constant 15.1*** -120.4 -24.4 15.6*** -137.1 15.7*** 93.3* 18.4*** -283.1 11.3*** 56.5 58.9*** 7.33*** -14.9 12.0*** -151.4** 13.0*** -50.0 
 
(0.43) (364.9) (59.85) (2.98) (370.1) (0.87) (52.98) (0.85) (470.9) (0.23) (218.2) (22.24) (1.06) (223.2) (0.35) (61.34) (0.63) (311.4) 
                   
Observations 903 903 903 903 903 759 759 724 724 998 998 998 998 998 854 854 852 852 
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
  
0.04 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 
  
0.01 0.05 
Municipalities 144 144 144 144 144 143 143 140 140 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 
Municipal FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Party FE NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES NO NO NO YES YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Small municipalities = below median minimum population (15,532) during the sample period (2009-15); large municipalities = above median. Standard errors, clustered at the 
municipal level, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A16. ODDS OF NO SINGLE BIDDING AND ONE-PARTY RULE. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
                                 Municipality-clustered SEs Random Effects 
                  
One-party rule 0.81 0.58*** 0.78 0.72* 0.70* 0.56*** 0.87 0.52** 
 
(0.15) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.24) (0.13) 
Population (log) 
 
0.28*** 
   
0.26*** 
 
0.16*** 
  
(0.04) 
   
(0.04) 
 
(0.03) 
Area (log) 
  
0.95 
  
0.80*** 
 
0.73*** 
   
(0.06) 
  
(0.06) 
 
(0.07) 
Median income 
   
1.00*** 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
    
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Constant 0.43*** 256,027*** 1.37 26.58*** 1.08 1,515,181*** 0.29*** 
297,344,715
*** 
 
(0.04) (321,883) (0.58) (26.99) (0.19) (2,606,607) (0.04) (620290202) 
         
Observations 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 
Municipalities 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 
Municipal FE NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES YES NO YES 
Party FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO YES 
Note. Dependent variable No single bidding in municipality during year. Odds ratios displayed. Estimations in columns 1-6 
using logistic regression with SEs clustered at the municipal level; estimations in columns 7-8 using random effects-logistical 
regression (xtlogit with option re in Stata 14). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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TABLE A17. ODDS OF NO SINGLE BIDDING AND NEW RULING PARTY. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Municipality-clustered SEs Fixed Effects 
                  
New ruling party 1.26 1.23 1.24 1.18 1.23 1.30 1.48* 1.46* 
 
(0.18) (0.21) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.23) (0.30) (0.33) 
Population (log) 
 
0.29*** 
   
0.26*** 
 
0.00** 
  
(0.03) 
   
(0.04) 
 
(0.00) 
Area (log) 
  
0.94 
  
0.80*** 
  
   
(0.06) 
  
(0.06) 
  
Median income 
   
1.00*** 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
    
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Constant 0.38*** 143,420*** 1.29 18.91*** 0.88 787,183*** 
  
 
(0.04) -166,129 (0.55) (18.89) (0.14) -1,342,717 
  
         
Observations 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,901 1,171 1,171 
Municipalities 288 288 288 288 288 288 175 175 
Municipal FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO YES YES YES YES YES NO YES 
Party FE NO NO NO NO YES YES NO YES 
Note. Dependent variable No single bidding in municipality during year. Odds ratios displayed. Estimations in columns 1-6 
using logistic regression with SEs clustered at the municipal level; estimations in columns 7-8 using conditional fixed effects-
logistical regression (xtlogit with option fe in Stata 14), resulting in the exclusion of municipalities without variation in the 
dependent variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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FIGURE A2. POLITICAL ENTRENCHMENT AND THE PROBABILITY OF  
SINGLE BIDDING OCCURRING. 
 
  
Note. Results represented by grey bars derived from column 6, table A15. Results represented by white bars derived from column 
6, table A16. Capped lines display 95% confidence intervals using standard errors clustered at the municipal level.  
 
TABLE A18. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES USED IN ANALYSIS OF MECHANISMS. 
 
n mean sd min max 
            
Single bidding ratio 275 12.21 7.74 0 41.7 
One-party rule 275 0.23 
   
New ruling party  275 0.25 
   
Population (log) 275 9.88 0.95 7.79 13.7 
Area (log) 275 6.49 1.27 2.16 9.87 
Median income 275 238,516 24,274 192,405 331,482 
Audit chair from majority   273
*
 0.17 0.38   
Media influence 275 4.60 0.87 1.93 6.71 
Bureaucratic human capital 275 45.3 6.99 31.6 77.0 
Local winner ratio 275 11.6 9.78 0 50 
Ruling party (% of cases) 
   Socialdemokraterna 275 46.6 
   Moderaterna 275 34.2 
   Centerpartiet 275 14.9 
   Kristdemokraterna 275 1.45 
   Folkpartiet 275 1.82 
   Vänsterpartiet 275 0.73 
   Other party 275 0.36 
               
*In two instances, Valdemarsvik and Orust municipalities, intra-term-period power shifts during the 2011-14 term preclude 
from identifying whether the audit chair is a representative of the majority. 
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TABLE A19. POLITICAL ENTRENCHMENT, AUDIT CONTROL,  
AND SINGLE BIDDING RATIO. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
DV:  
Audit chair from majority 
DV:  
Single bidding ratio 
              
One-party rule 2.22** 2.53** 
    
 
(0.77) (1.01) 
    
New ruling party 
  
0.39** 0.36** 
  
   
(0.18) (0.17) 
  Audit chair from majo-
rity 
    
1.38 1.27 
     
(1.29) (1.22) 
Population (log) 
 
1.16 
 
1.09 
 
-1.08** 
  
(0.28) 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.52) 
Area (log) 
 
0.99 
 
1.02 
 
0.82* 
  
(0.15) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.47) 
Median income 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
 
-0.00 
  
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Constant 0.17*** 0.36 0.25*** 0.88 11.96*** 25.77*** 
 
(0.03) (0.97) (0.04) (2.37) (0.51) (9.47) 
       
Observations 273 273 273 273 273 273 
R-squared 
    
0.00 0.08 
Party FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Columns 1-4 display odds ratios, columns 5-6 regression coefficients. To avoid excluding cases for the estimations with 
Party FEs in the logistic regression framework, Party FEs are sorted into Socialdemokraterna, Moderaterna, Centerpartiet, and 
all other parties into one category. This alteration does not affect the main results. Data averaged for the 2011-14 term period. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A20. POLITICAL ENTRENCHMENT, MEDIA INFLUENCE,  
AND SINGLE BIDDING RATIO. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
DV:  
Media influence 
DV:  
Single bidding ratio 
              
One-party rule -0.59*** -0.41*** 
    
 
(0.12) (0.13) 
    
New ruling party 
  
0.16 0.18 
  
   
(0.12) (0.12) 
  
Media influence 
    
-1.20** -1.18** 
     
(0.51) (0.55) 
Population (log) 
 
0.07 
 
0.09 
 
-1.04* 
  
(0.05) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.54) 
Area (log) 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
0.83* 
  
(0.04) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.48) 
Median income 
 
-0.00** 
 
-0.00** 
 
-0.00 
  
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Local press coverage 
 
0.15 
 
0.16 
 
1.03 
  
(0.28) 
 
(0.29) 
 
(2.79) 
Constant 4.73*** 4.99*** 4.56*** 4.65*** 17.73*** 30.97*** 
 
(0.06) (0.79) (0.06) (0.83) (2.49) (10.15) 
       
Observations 275 275 275 275 275 275 
R-squared 0.08 0.20 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.10 
Party FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Data averaged for the 2011-14 term period. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A21. POLITICAL ENTRENCHMENT, BUREAUCRATIC HUMAN CAPITAL,  
AND SINGLE BIDDING RATIO. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
DV:  
Bureaucratic human capital 
DV:  
Single bidding ratio 
              
One-party rule -3.16*** -0.83* 
    
 
(0.96) (0.45) 
    
New ruling party 
  
-2.19*** 0.34 
  
   
(0.84) (0.44) 
  Bureaucratic human 
capital 
    
-0.34*** -0.35*** 
     
(0.07) (0.13) 
Population (log) 
 
2.57*** 
 
2.57*** 
 
-0.19 
  
(0.31) 
 
(0.31) 
 
(0.72) 
Area (log) 
 
-1.35*** 
 
-1.34*** 
 
0.38 
  
(0.20) 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.50) 
Median income 
 
0.00*** 
 
0.00*** 
 
-0.00 
  
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Population human 
capital 
 
0.54*** 
 
0.56*** 
 
0.17 
  
(0.09) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.15) 
Constant 45.99*** 13.64*** 45.82*** 13.33*** 27.40*** 29.91*** 
 
(0.48) (4.10) (0.51) (4.09) (3.32) (11.04) 
       
Observations 275 275 275 275 275 275 
R-squared 0.04 0.75 0.02 0.74 0.09 0.11 
Party FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Data averaged for the 2011-14 term period. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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TABLE A22. POLITICAL ENTRENCHMENT, LOCAL WINNER RATIO, AND SINGLE BIDDING RATIO. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
DV:  
Local winner ratio 
DV:  
Single bidding ratio 
              
One-party rule 1.51 0.90 
    
 
(1.36) (1.33) 
    
New ruling party 
  
-0.59 -1.73 
  
   
(1.33) (1.27) 
  
Local winner ratio 
    
0.10** 0.08 
     
(0.05) (0.07) 
Population (log) 
 
2.68*** 
 
2.60*** 
 
-1.35** 
  
(0.78) 
 
(0.78) 
 
(0.59) 
Area (log) 
 
2.53*** 
 
2.60*** 
 
0.89* 
  
(0.56) 
 
(0.57) 
 
(0.51) 
Median income 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00 
 
-0.00* 
  
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
 
(0.00) 
Constant 11.22*** -23.97** 11.71*** -22.34** 11.15*** 28.50*** 
 
(0.65) (10.18) (0.65) (10.16) (0.74) (9.91) 
       
Observations 264 264 264 264 264 264 
R-squared 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.23 0.02 0.12 
Party FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Note. Data averaged for the 2011-14 term period. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
